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Growing evidence, as presented by Jaswal and Akhtar, indicates that social motivation is not 
universally reduced in autism. Here, we evaluate and extend this argument in light of recent 
evidence of ‘compensation’ in autism. We thereby argue that autistic ‘compensators’ – exhibiting 
neurotypical behaviour despite persistent difficulties in social cognition – indicate intact or 
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Main Text  
 
Jaswal & Akhtar (J&A) challenge the view that social motivation is universally reduced in 
autism by exploring alternative explanations for common autistic behaviours and presenting 
autistic testimony. Additional research supporting this view, not discussed by J&A, is found 
in the growing literature on ‘compensation’ in autism. Compensation refers to the mechanism 
underlying improved behavioural presentation (i.e., reduced symptoms) of a condition such 
as autism, despite ongoing atypicalities at cognitive and/or neurobiological levels (Livingston 
& Happé, 2017). An autistic ‘compensator’ may therefore appear non-autistic in their social 
behaviour so that they ‘pass’ as neurotypical, but continue experiencing social cognitive 
differences and difficulties. For example, they may compensate for a core difficulty in 
understanding others’ mental states (i.e., in theory of mind) by using alternative cognitive 
processes to navigate social situations. This might involve using general cognitive abilities 
(Lai et al., 2017) to learn and apply social rules (e.g., making deliberate eye contact) and 
engage in socially normative interactions (e.g., small talk). In a recent study (Livingston, 
Colvert, Social Relationships Study Team, Bolton, & Happé, 2018), we reported evidence for 
many ‘high compensators’ who, despite poor theory of mind task performance, showed 
neurotypical social skills as measured using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(Lord et al, 2000). Crucially, the existence of high compensators is not consistent with the 
notion that autistic people do not seek or value social contact, as predicted by social 
motivation theory (e.g., Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). Instead, high 
compensators appear motivated to overcome substantial social cognitive difficulties by 
adopting neurotypical social rules and interactive styles, indicating that at least a subgroup of 
autistic individuals have intact social motivation. More broadly, the existence of 
compensation in autism follows J&A’s argument that, while social motivation may be 
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reduced in some autistic people, several behaviours observed in autism can be explained by 
cognitive mechanisms unrelated to social motivation.  
 
Further evidence that many autistic people, particularly those showing high levels of 
compensation, are socially motivated comes from empirical reports on the phenomenological 
experience of compensation. Whereas J&A focus on autistic testimony in anecdotal form, a 
new body of qualitative research indicates that many autistic people are motivated to 
compensate to fit into and succeed in the social world (e.g., maintain relationships and 
employment). Qualitative responses indicate, for example, a desire to avoid social rejection 
(e.g., “avoid looking like a social clumsy idiot”; Hull et al., 2017, p. 2525) and behave like 
neurotypical individuals to make social connections (“I do like people…I would not get along 
with people at all if I relied on my…autistic impulses”; personal communication, 2017). This 
involves several strategies, such as masking socially undesirable behaviours (e.g., hiding 
special interests), and employing active compensatory strategies (e.g., pre-planning 
conversations) to superficially demonstrate ‘good’ social skills (Dean, Harwood, & Kasari, 
2017; Hull et al., 2017; Tierney, Burns, & Kilbey, 2016). Additionally, some of the anecdotes 
presented by J&A could be viewed in the context of compensation. For example, “I did not 
give up but started to talk to and hang around a group of ‘popular’ girls” (Harris, 2015, as 
cited in J&A), describes a common compensatory strategy of affiliating with and copying 
socially skilled people. Together, we suggest that the existence and frequent use of 
compensatory strategies is not consistent with a central tenet of the social motivation theory 
that autistic people do not work to manage their reputation. 
 
Evidence of compensation indicates that social motivation may even be atypically high in 
autism. We tentatively speculate that autistic compensators may require greater social 
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motivation than neurotypical people to overcome social cognitive difficulties and perform 
comparably in social situations. Such heightened motivation is possible given that many 
autistic people actively choose to use compensatory strategies despite substantial costs to 
their psychological resources and mental health. Indeed, they report expending energy on 
compensation, comparing it to physical exercise or mental arithmetic, thus draining resources 
required for daily functioning (Hull et al., 2017; Tierney et al., 2016). Compensation has been 
linked with anxiety (Livingston et al., 2018), depression (Lai et al., 2018) and suicidal 
ideation (Cassidy, Bradley, Shaw, & Baron-Cohen, 2018), indicating a potential cost of using 
compensatory strategies to mental health. One possible explanation for this is because 
compensatory strategies can be rudimentary (e.g., inflexible across different contexts and 
break down under stress; Livingston & Happé, 2017), allowing one to ‘pass’ as neurotypical, 
but may not be sufficient to experience fulfilling social interactions. This could leave autistic 
compensators feeling isolated and at risk for mental health problems, especially given their 
potentially high levels of social motivation.  
 
Although we have focused on intact or heightened social motivation in autism, the literature 
on compensation also provides clues about why some autistic people appear to have reduced 
social motivation. In light of the emerging link between compensation and costs to mental 
health, reduced social motivation could be an adaptive developmental response to limited 
social cognitive and compensatory resources (see Johnson, 2017). Accordingly, instead of 
compensating, some autistic individuals choose to be in environments where non-social skills 
are valued over social skills (Livingston & Happé, 2017). Reduced social motivation may 
therefore help to protect these individuals against mental health problems otherwise 
experienced by autistic compensators. As such, we propose that intact social motivation in 
autism may not be as positive as framed by J&A and caution against suggestions that reduced 
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social motivation, where observed in autism, should necessarily be targeted in clinical 
interventions.  
  
In summary, we support J&A’s central claim that reduced social motivation is not a universal 
feature of autism, but extend this argument with research on compensation in autism. We 
have argued that autistic compensators reflect a subgroup of autistic people with intact or 
potentially heightened social motivation, but equally, that the costs of compensation may 
explain why some autistic people appear to have reduced social motivation. Moving forward, 
we suggest that research aimed at disentangling the interrelationships between compensation, 
social motivation and mental health could help design interventions to improve the wellbeing 
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